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Abstract 
We investigate the nature of the inflation bias in a model that exhibits asymmetries in preferences and non–normality 
in shocks but simplifies to the classic Barro-Gordon problem as a special case. The inflation bias is shown to depend 
on the trade-off between preference, structural and the scale and shape parameters of the model.
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1.  Introduction 
 
The standard assumptions in the first analyses of independent central banks are that 
that they target output above the natural rate, the central banks preferences are 
quadratic and that the supply curve or Phillips curve is linear. These assumptions 
generate an inflationary bias. (see e.g. Svensson (1997)). However all of these  
assumptions are questionable. First prominent Central bankers argue that they do not 
target output above the natural rate. For example, Vickers (1998, p369) writes “There 
is a large literature on inflation bias but it simply is not applicable to the Monetary 
Policy Committee. We have no desire to spring inflation surprises to try to bump 
output above its natural rate (whatever that may be)”. Whilst Blinder (1998, p43) 
argues that policy makers at the Fed do not try to systematically maintain employment 
above the natural level. As a matter of fact he personally felt duty bound to pick 
monetary policy so as to hit the natural rate when in office. In addition The Governor 
of the Bank of England, King (1996), in a theoretical model, assumes that the central 
bank has no desire to have unemployment rates below (or output rates above) their 
natural-rate values. 
 
Second there seems no good reason to assume that either output or inflation 
preferences are necessarily symmetric. For example Cuckierman (2002) writes 
“While casual observation suggests that policymakers dislike employment below the 
normal level, it does not support the notion that, given inflation, they also dislike 
employment above the normal level. Given inflation, some politicians probably even 
like positive output gaps on the view that the higher output is, the better it is. As a 
matter of fact, it is quite likely that the quadratic function on the output gap, so often 
used in the academic literature, was chosen mainly for analytical convenience rather 
than for descriptive realism”. Similar observations can be made concerning inflation. 
The ECB target of  2% inflation is explicitly asymmetric  and Nobay and Peel (2003)  
suggest that the Bank of England had an asymmetric target at least in its first few 
years of formulation. Finally empirical evidence suggests the supply curve is 
nonlinear. See for example  Clarke, Laxton and Rose (1996), Eisner (1997) and  
Stiglitz (1984).  
 
It is now recognized  that an inflation bias -positive or negative, can arise from either 
nonlinear preferences of the central bank over either or both of inflation and output or 
a nonlinear supply or Phillips curve3 even when the central bank targets the natural 
rate. (see e.g. Bean (1996), Tambakis (1999), Cuckierman (2002), Nobay and Peel 
(2000), (2003)). A number of authors have examined time series or cross section data 
to determine whether there is a significant inflation bias. Ruge-Murcia (2004) 
assumes inflation preferences are asymmetric so that any bias will depend on the 
variance of inflation. (see Nobay and Peel (2003)). For the inflation targeting counties 
he studies he finds some support for the proposition that average inflation is 
                                                 
3
 There is a growing number of papers that report empirical evidence of non linear Taylor rules which 
are consistent with one or both of  nonlinear preferences and a nonlinear Phillips curve. (see e.g 
Osborne(2005),. Surico (2004),Dolado et al (2004), Dolado et al(2005), Taylor and Davradakis (2006), 
Martin and Milas,(2007) and   Cukierman  and Muscatelli (2007)). 
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negatively related to the variance of inflation. In contrast Gerlach and Cuckierman 
(2003) assume asymmetry in the output objective and report a positive relationship 
between average inflation and output variability. 
  
Our purpose in this note is to characterize the nature of the inflation bias that can 
occur in a one-period Barro-Gordon problem under a fairly general specification of 
the structural equations and additionally that   the random shock to supply  can be 
non-normally distributed. In order to maintain some tractability we assume that the 
central banks preferences  and the Phillips curve take the Linex form so that quadratic 
preferences as well as a linear supply curve are nested. 
 
 Random disturbances are assumed to be drawn from a skew-normal distribution4 so 
that the standard normal density is obtained as a special case. This set up allows us to 
consider the nature of the inflation bias in a more general setting than in previous 
analyses.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we set out our analysis and 
discuss some of the salient implications relative to the assumption of quadratic loss 
and linear Phillips curve.  In Section 3 we present our theoretical results. Concluding 
comments are offered in the final section. 
 
2.  Analysis under Non-Normality and Asymmetric Preferences 
 
The Phillips curve is assumed to take the  form assumed in Nobay and Peel (2000)  
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 The density function of the Skew-Normal distribution for the noise v is given by 
( ) ( ) ( )vsvvpdf Φ= φ2  
where φ( . ) and Φ( . ) denote the density and cumulative density respectively of a standard normal 
variable. The Skew-Normal accommodates a rich variety of skewness and kurtosis patterns as the 
shape parameter s varies and converges to the Normal as 0→s . See e.g. Arnold and Lin (2004). 
 
 Formally, the first four moments of the standard Skew-Normal variable vpi are given by 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )




































=δ   
 
As the shape parameter s tends to zero, the moments of the Skew Normal reduce to those of the 
Standard Normal. More generally, the moment generating admits a closed form expression, that is 











which can be interpreted as twice the moment generating function of the standard normal, times a 
shape parameter-related adjustment. Clearly, as the shape parameter s tends to zero, the moment 
generating function reduces to that of a standard normal variable. 
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( )( )[ ] pipiσκpipi vyygg n
e +−−=− 1exp1    (1) 
 
where, pi is  inflation, pie  is the rational expectation of inflation formed  before 
realization of shocks at time t, y is real output, yn is the normal or natural rate of 
output, g,  κ  are constants and ( )pipi sSNv ~  is distributed as a Skew-Normal random 
variable with shape parameter spi. This non linear Linex form has a number of 
convenient properties apart from providing analytic tractability. First, in (1)  > 0κ  
implies a convex Phillips curve, perhaps the case best supported by empirical 
evidence (see e.g. Clarke, Laxton and Rose (1996), though  0κ < , a concave Phillips 
curve, has some theoretical and empirical support (see e.g. Stiglitz (1984), Eisner 
(1997). Second, as 0→g  the above relationship (1) reduces to the linear Phillips 
relationship of the form 
 
( ) pipiσκpipi vyy ne +−=−     (2) 
  
From inspection of (1) the reduced form for output is given by 
 
( ) yyvzfy σ+=     (3) 
 
where f ( z ) is a conditionally known deterministic function of a set of instruments z 
and ( )yy sSNv ~  is distributed as a Skew-Normal random variable with shape 
parameter sy. We note that in the case where output is assumed to be distributed 
conditionally normal we can obtain, by taking the rational expectation of equation (1), 
that E y y g yt n− = −1 2
κ (var ) , where var y is the variance of y. We observe that output 
can have a mean higher or lower than the natural rate depending on the curvature of 
the Phillips curve. (see also  see Bean (1996)). In the case of a linear Phillips curve, 
from (3),  E y f z yt n− = =1 ( ) .  
 
Inflation and output preferences are  assumed to be given by the Linex form  as in 
Nobay and Peel (2003). 
 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]




















where we  denote the inflation and output targets by pi* and y* respectively. 
 
The Linex form nests the quadratic form as a special case. As 0, →αγ  we obtain 
quadratic output and inflation preferences. For a non-zero αγ ,  the costs to 
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undershooting (overshooting) the inflation or output targets are non-symmetric. 
Cukierman (2002) states the case for an asymmetric output objective. He writes “ But 
it is hard to see why CBs, social planners, or political authorities would consider, 
given inflation, a positive output gap of a given magnitude to be equivalent to a 
negative output gap of the same magnitude. A negative output gap means that 
employment is below the normal level, whereas a positive output gap means 
employment is above the normal level. While casual observation suggests that 
policymakers dislike employment below the normal level, it does not support the 
notion that, given inflation, they also dislike employment above the normal level”. 
 
Nobay and Peel suggest inflation preferences may be asymmetric. They note  that the 
costs of inflation beneath target maybe  lower ceteris paribus, than the costs of 
exceeding target. For instance the ECB target is 2.5% or less. 
 
The policy maker’s optimization problem is 
 ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ]αpipiλγλγαpipi pi ;;,,;,min **** −+−=−− LEyyLEyyLE yy  (4) 
 
As is standard, e.g. Svensson (1997), inflation is assumed to be set by the authorities 
after observation of the supply shock.5 
 
3.  Theoretical Results 
 
Closed form solutions do not exist for the “general case “ set out above. However we 
can elucidate the key  implications by considering a number of special cases which we 
set out as propositions. We first consider the case of a linear Phillips curve   so that  
f z yn( ) = . We also assume that the authorities target the natural so that any inflation 
bias is not a resultant of targeting a higher level of output than the natural rate. For 
simplicity we set y yn* = = 0 . 
  
In Proposition 1 we set out the general form of optimal policy rule under Linex 
Preferences and Skew Normal shocks for both inflation and output. 
 
Proposition 1. In the presence of Linex preferences and skew-normal shocks for both 
inflation and output, the optimal policy rule under the linear Phillips relationship of 
equation (2), is  
 
( )[ ]





















                                                 
5
 Although we are interested in the inflation bias  and the policy maker’s choice variable is the inflation 
rate, the first-order condition for a minimum may be expressed as a function of either inflation or 
output  by applying the chain rule. 
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where 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )





































































= and Φ( ) denotes the cumulative standard normal 
density. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
We observe that the inflation bias depends on both of the variances of inflation and 
output.  Since Normality is a special case of Skew Normality and symmetric quadratic 
preferences is a special case of Linex, a number of interesting combinations are nested 
as special cases of our Proposition (available on request). In the following Corollary 1 
we provide two such cases to indicate the impact and the trade-off between preference 
and density asymmetries in the context of a linear Phillips curve. 
 
Corollary 1. The optimal policy rule of Proposition 1 in the case (1a) symmetric 
quadratic inflation loss preferences 1(b) normal shock innovations and symmetric 



















Proof: See Appendix. 
 
From 1(a) we note that the inflation bias depends on the variances of inflation and 
output and also skewness. In particular, observe that the inflation bias will be positive 
if and only if yyδσκσδ pipi > . This contrasts with the standard case of quadratic 
preferences 1(b) where there is no bias given that the central bank targets the natural 
rate. 
 
We now turn our attention to the impact of preference and density asymmetries in the 
presence of a non-linear Phillips curve of Linex form.   
 
Proposition 2. In the presence of Linex preferences and skew-normal shocks for both 
inflation and output, the optimal policy rule under the non-linear Phillips relationship 
of equation (1) does not admit a closed form expression.  
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Proof: See Appendix 
 
Although the assumptions of Proposition 2 do not lead to a closed-form solution to the 
optimal policy problem, it is possible to achieve a result by allowing simpler inflation 
preferences. We provide such an analysis in Proposition 3. 
 
Proposition 3. In the presence of Linex preferences for output, symmetric quadratic 
preferences for inflation and skew-normal shocks for both inflation and output, the 
optimal policy rule under the non-linear Phillips relationship of equation (1) is given 
by   
( )
( )












































( ) ( ) ( )















































and Φ( ) denotes the cumulative standard normal density. 
 
Proof: See Appendix 
 
We observe a complex form of the inflation bias. As in Proposition 1 above a number 
of interesting combinations are nested as special cases of our Proposition 3. In the 
following Corollary 3 we provide three such cases (others available on request) which 
indicate the impact and the trade-off between preference and density asymmetries in 
the context of a non-linear Phillips curve. 
 
Corollary 3. 3(a)  symmetric quadratic output loss preferences, or (3b) linear Phillips, 













































































In order to demonstrate how non-normality of errors and non linear structural 
equations  impact on the inflation bias  we have investigated the properties of a model 
that exhibits the Barro-Gordon problem as a special case. 
 
We assume the authorities target the natural rate, as they profess to do. Not 
surprisingly the model exhibits an inflation bias that depends in a complex manner on 
the various parameters of model. The bias will not be zero if either preferences or the 
Phillips curve are nonlinear. Of particular interest is that the bias depends on the  scale 
and shape parameters of the model. In this context, Goodhart’s (2001) comments on 
the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee are interesting. He writes: “But in 
either case the existence of a skew would affect our decision on the appropriate 
interest rate. Unlike uncertainty and variance, skew and risk mapped directly into the 
interest rate decision.” Our model captures this observation. 
 
The results appear to have implications for the measure of inflation that policy makers 
target. If the chosen measure exhibits excess skew, say the overall CPI, as opposed to, 
say, a trimmed mean that does not, then we would expect, ceteris paribus, more 
evidence of bias in the former case than in the latter. This type of prediction might 
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Proof of Proposition 1. 
 
Assuming that relationship (2) holds, we differentiate (4) with respect to y to obtain 
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taking expectations we obtain 
 






Substituting for pi from equation (2) and for y using equation (3) and using Proposition 
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Solving with respect to epi  we obtain the result. ■ 
 
Proof of Corollary 1. As shape parameters 0→pis  and 0→ys  the moment 
generating functions reduce to normality 
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( ) ( )
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Substituting to Proposition 1 we obtain (1a) and (1b).  
■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2. 
 
Assuming that relationship (1) holds, we differentiate (4) with respect to y to obtain 
 






Substituting for pi from (1) and taking expectations we cannot arrive to a closed form 
expression since the term  
 ( )[ ]*exp pipiα −  
 




Proof of Proposition 3. 
 
As 0→α  the Linex function for inflation reduces to a quadratic loss of the form 
 
( ) ( )2**
2
1
; pipiαpipipi −=−L  
 
Then, differentiating (4) using equation (1), we obtain the first order condition  
 
( )[ ][ ] ( ) ( )( ) 0exp1exp1 ** =−−+−− nyygyy κpipiκλγγ  
 
and substituting for pi from (1) we obtain 
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Then, substituting for y from equation (3) and taking expectations using Proposition 1 
of Arnold and Lin (2004), we obtain 
 
( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )





















Solving with respect to epi  we obtain the result. ■ 
 
 
Proof of Corollary 3. 
 




 vanishes which proves (3a). Allowing 0→ys  
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which proves (3c). ■ 
 
 
  
